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Attributing Responsibility to the Narrative Self
David L. Thompson
1 Introduction: The Question
The question which my paper will address is best raised by considering
a number of concrete scenarios. 
Kenneth Parks, a 23-year-old Toronto man, was suffering from severe 
insomnia caused by joblessness and gambling debts.  Early in the morning of
May 23, 1987 he arose, got in his car and drove 23 kilometres to his in-laws' 
home. He stabbed to death his mother-in-law, whom he loved.   He then 
went to the police, and, in a confused state, said that he was afraid he might 
have killed someone.  The defence relied on expert psychiatric opinion to 
argue that Parks had been in a somnambulist state and so was innocent of 
any crime.  In 1988 the jury agreed and acquitted him.  The case was 
appealed to the Canadian Supreme Court which, in 1992, sustained the 
jury’s acquittal. (https://db0nus869y26v.cloudfront.net/en/R_v_Parks  ) 
Another scenario (hypothetical):  consider of the case of a woman 
mystified to find new clothes in her closet, clothes she has no recollection of 
buying.  Her own signature on her credit card slips, however, makes it clear 
that she was the one who bought them.  This is typical of purported cases of 
multiple personality disorder.  Her body was involved in the purchase, 
although the actual action was performed by one of her alter-egos.  She 
denies all responsibility for the purchase; the action was performed by 
someone else.
For a third scenario, consider a person who, under hypnosis, promises 
to sell his car for one dollar, indeed signs a legally binding contract to do so.  
The next day, discovering that he had been hypnotized, he repudiates the 
contract, claiming that he was not responsible for the promise and so is not 
bound by it.
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Finally, as my last scenario, consider a “normal” case.  I borrow $20 
from a stranger and promise to repay it the next day.  When we meet the 
next day, the stranger says, “Weren’t you the one who promised to repay me
$20 today?”  I respond, “Oh, Yes! I’m the one” and hand over the cash.
Each of these scenarios involves the identity of a person (or self -- I’ll 
be using the two terms interchangeably).  Clearly, however, in these cases it 
is not a matter of the identity of a body that is at stake, but rather the 
question of which actions are those of the person involved, which ones are 
his or mine, and which commitments the self is responsible for.  An action is 
mine, that is, I “own” it, if I am responsible for it.  But what is it to be 
responsible for an event?  The notion of responsibility that I want to examine 
includes legal and moral responsibility, but is not restricted to them.  The 
concept I want is more fundamental than either, for both moral and legal 
responsibility depend on what one might call basic responsibility.  
When a white pawn is moved in a game of chess we distinguish 
between the case when it is moved by an earth tremor or by one of the 
players.  Even when one of the players is the cause of the movement, it fails 
to count as a move in the game if the player’s finger moves it by accident 
when reaching for another piece. It is a chess move only when the player 
explicitly or implicitly declares ownership of the move, that is, acknowledges 
responsibility for it.  In this case there is no moral or legal issue at stake: to 
say I’m responsible for the move is not yet to evaluate the move in any way. 
It is simply to claim that the move is an action, and to attribute the 
responsibility for that action to the same self which has made or will make 
other moves with other white pieces.  
The notion of a continuing self responsible for its actions is a 
prerequisite for any subsequent question about moral or legal responsibility. 
This is the point that Paul Ricoeur is making when he distinguishes between 
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description, ascription, and prescription.1  We can describe an event: the 
pawn moves; we can ascribe an action: that is the player’s move in the 
game; or we can prescribe an action: that is, refer to what the person 
morally ought to do.  Without the prior notion of an agent or self to whom we
can ascribe basic responsibility, there would be nothing to which we could 
later attribute moral or legal responsibility.
My aim in this paper is examine what it is to attribute responsibility, in 
this basic sense, to a self.  First I will outline a metaphysical analysis of 
identity, and then I will offer some criticisms of that position.  Finally I will 
present a positive exposition of the narrative theory of selfhood and show 
how it might account for the attribution of responsibility to a self. 
2 The Metaphysical Way
Let me start by sketching an approach that I think is wrong.  Some 
philosophers believe that to understand the attribution of responsibility we 
must first establish what it is for an object called the self to remain self-
identical over time.  Historically, this is how John Locke first introduced us to 
the issue.  Locke claims that “person” is a forensic concept, and that we 
should only reward or punish someone for an act if they are “identical” to the
person who committed the act.  I care about reward or punishment, and 
indeed, my survival in the future, only if it will be the selfsame me who 
survives.
Parfit continues this tradition when he asks whether, if a 
teletransporter disassembles me and re-creates me atom by atom on Mars, 
the new me is numerically identical with the earthling or only qualitatively 
1 “If ascribing is not describing, is this not by virtue of a certain affinity, which remains to 
be clarified, with prescribing?” Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 99.
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similar.  If the latter, then I have not been transported to Mars, but have 
died.  If I have not survived, however, then presumably the Martian me has 
no more responsibility for the actions or commitments that the earthling me 
had made than my qualitatively identical twin would have.  Whether I am 
responsible or not depends on the prior question about whether I have 
remained numerically self-identical.2 From this point of view, responsibility 
depends on and presupposes identity
This approach – the one I am challenging – might be called the 
“metaphysical” approach.  This position thinks of the self as an objective 
entity which remains identical with itself over time and the approach 
conceives of responsibility for an action as a property or accident of that 
entity.  To put it in logical terms, responsibility for an action is a property 
which is predicated of a subject.  Whether a proposition attributing this 
property to a subject is true or not depends on how the world is in itself; 
there is in reality a fact of the matter upon which the truth-value of the 
proposition depends.  Locke argues that the metaphysical substrate to which
the property of responsibility is attributed is neither the body, nor a spiritual 
substance, such as a Cartesian mind.3  Whether such an objective self is 
mental, physical or something else is a secondary issue; the crucial point for 
the  metaphysical approach is that it is the substrate that accounts for the 
self’s enduring identity.
This approach is inherited from Descartes’ substantialism.  Descartes 
holds that, while the body is a substance, the mind cannot be identified with 
it; the mind is an independent substance in its own right.  But because of his 
epistemological concern about certainty, Descartes has a peculiar notion of 
this substantiality.   He claims to be certain of his existence at the instant 
when he thinks about himself, but, since memory is subject to doubt, it is 
2 Parfit,  Reasons and Persons, 197 and following.
3 Locke, Essay, Chapter XXVII.
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only by reliance on the self-constancy of God that his duration over time is 
assured.  For Descartes, no substance has the power to maintain itself in 
existence from one point of time to the next, so only the continuous re-
creative intervention of God ensures the appearance of continuous self-
identity over time.4  Such a “punctualist” approach raises a fundamental 
question which will dominate discussion for the subsequent three centuries: 
if at a point in time God re-creates Descartes anew and creates in him 
“memories” of experiences at previous points in time, is the appearance of 
numerical identity merely an illusion, since the new Descartes is only 
qualitatively similar to the previous one?  Parfit, for example, places the 
question in the technological context of teleportation rather than Descartes’ 
theological context, but his concern that my Martian self might be only 
qualitatively identical with my earthly self and not numerically identical with 
it, continues the Cartesian metaphysical approach.
This kind of punctualism also underpins the notion of mental state that 
has developed in recent decades in much of the philosophy of mind.  
Analytic philosophers of mind have investigated the relationship between 
brain processes and mental states.  Functionalism, which I consider the most
plausible approach, understands mental events as functional states which 
might conceivably be realized in multiple, alternative brain processes.  This 
cognitive model explains action in terms of the current mental beliefs and 
desires of the agent.  In principle the approach could be used to account for 
mental states in nonhuman animals, although there has been significant 
debate about the status of beliefs in organisms without language.   The focus
of this approach has been on individual mental states, time-slices of life, as it
were, and their relationship to brain processes.  What makes the approach 
punctualist is that each individual current mental state is considered 
primarily in its relationship to brain processes while the dependence of these
4 Descartes, Meditation III, para. 31.
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states on the ongoing life of a self dispersed in time is seldom considered.  
Indeed I would like in my vocabulary to distinguish a functionalist notion of 
mind from the alternative concept of self which I’m examining.
It is not impossible for this punctualist metaphysical identity approach 
to account for the problems of responsible selfhood raised by the scenarios 
at the beginning of my paper.  It might find some way of establishing that 
Kenneth Parks, the sleepwalking killer, was not the same person asleep as 
when awake, and so the waking Parks was not responsible for the actions of 
the sleeping Parks.  I suppose one could say that he did not have any 
intention, since he was asleep.  Or perhaps one could claim that he didn’t 
have the belief that it was his mother-in-law he was killing.  Or one could 
devise some system of excuses for actions by sleeping selves.  But all of 
these seem to me to be ad hoc, and forces the phenomena into a 
Procrustean bed because of dogmatic attachment to a philosophical theory.  
The narrativists think they have a better way for understanding responsibility
and criticize the metaphysical identity approach on this basis.
3 Narrativist criticism of the metaphysical approach
From the viewpoint of the narrativist position there are a number of 
criticisms which can be made of the approach that I have outlined.  The first 
is that the metaphysical position treats the person as an object which 
remains identical in itself through time, regardless of the person’s 
knowledge.  This criticism simply draws out the implications of an argument 
already presented by John Locke.  Locke argues that personal identity, as a 
forensic concept, must not be confused with material identity as a physical 
object, with biological identity as an organism or with spiritual identity as a 
substantial mind. His argument uses thought experiments of body exchange,
or of the soul’s reincarnation, to appeal to the intuitive injustice of punishing 
a person for crimes they have no memory of or are not conscious of.  But the
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essence of his argument is to overthrow any attempt to conceive of the self 
as an object or substance of any kind.  No matter what kind of object we 
might conceive the self to be, we can always devise a thought experiment in 
which lack of memory or consciousness makes that object’s identity 
irrelevant from a forensic point of view, that is, with respect to selfhood.5   
Whatever the notion of self is trying to illuminate, any appeal to substantial 
identity will fail to enlighten us.
A similar criticism is offered by Schechtman.  Her claim is that 
punctualists are asking the wrong question.  Punctualists ask the 
“reidentification question:” under what conditions can we identify person-
stage A with a later person-stage B.  Narrativists, on the other hand, ask the 
characterization question: when can we attribute a characteristic to a self?  
The logical structure of the two questions is quite different.  The narrativist 
question does not attempt to conjoin two entities, but to conjoin a property 
to a self.  Under what conditions can a person be said to be responsible for a 
previous action?  When can we attribute to someone the characteristic of 
“being committed,” for example, being bound by a promise?  This is quite a 
different question than the reidentification question, so we should not be too 
surprised that the kind of answers offered are also different.  Schechtman 
claims that, as philosophers, we became interested in the question of 
selfhood in the first place because of four concerns: 
1. We are interested in our own survival; 
2. We need an account of moral responsibility; 
3. We need to explain the unique concern we have about our own life; 
4. We want to know to whom compensation, that is, reward and 
punishment, is due.6  
5 “Self depends on consciousness, not on substance. Self is that conscious thinking thing,--whatever
substance made up of, (whether spiritual or material, simple or compounded, it matters not)--which is
sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for
itself, as far as that consciousness extends.” Locke, Essay, 156. (Ch XXVII, para 17.)
6 Schechtman, Constitution, 2.
David L. Thompson                                          Attributing Responsibility to the Narrative Self                                                 8
Only the characterization question, she claims, engages seriously with these 
issues.  The punctualists’ reidentification question invariably disappoints 
because it attempts to treat selfhood as an object in-itself, a fact of the 
matter, rather than as a feature of experience. 
A different line of criticism can be directed at the belief/desire 
explanation of action.  This approach isolates a particular moment or action 
in the life of an individual and explains the action on the basis of the 
conditions present at that moment.  Indeed Parfit makes it an explicit thesis 
of his “reductionist” theory that there are events – including mental events – 
that can be specified independently of reference to the ongoing life of any 
person.7  But this punctualist approach seldom if ever makes sense in a 
human context.  If I repay you $20 because of the belief that I owe it to you 
and the desire to be honest, then this explanation of the action, and indeed 
the very action itself, only makes sense in a wider temporal context.  We 
need to understand that yesterday I borrowed $20 from you and promised 
then that I would repay it, and to understand that I am concerned to 
preserve my reputation of honesty in the future.  Without this temporal 
context the movement of hands and paper would not even be an action of 
“repayment.”  I cannot just, out of the blue one morning, wake up owing you 
$20 and repay you.  Even if, during sleep some kind of post-hypnotic 
suggestion was implanted in me that I had promised you $20, I must 
attribute that promising to myself rather than to the hypnotist – mistakenly 
as it happens – in order to believe that I owe the money to you.  To 
understand action we need to incorporate the notion of enduring 
responsibility into our conceptual scheme, over and above momentary states
of belief and desire.  Actions, beliefs and desires only make sense in the 
context of a unified life.8 
7   Parfit, Reasons, 340.
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For example, to understand my action of writing a paper for a 
conference it is not enough to explain my intention as a psychological 
function realized in certain brain processes, though this is not incorrect.  My 
intention cannot occur out of the blue, but is only this intention if writing 
such a paper is in my repertoire, is among my competencies.  If I had not 
been trained as an academic, if I didn’t understand the point of a conference,
if I didn’t have some minimal grasp of how to structure a talk, I could not be 
said to have the intention of writing such a paper.  So Parfit’s reductionism is
wrong: the individual intention, the momentary mental state, can only be 
that kind of state within the context of my personal history no matter what 
brain process it is realized in.   Similarly there is also a social and institutional
context which has constructed the notion of a conference, the norms for 
academic talks, and disciplinary boundaries within which the content of my 
paper makes sense. 
One attempt to respond to these criticisms of the metaphysical identity
approach might be to supplement the punctualist notion of selfhood by 
finding some way to incorporate the concept of responsibility.  More 
interesting is to consider the possibility that the theory is fundamentally 
flawed in a way that ad hoc fixes cannot repair.  The better alternative is 
think of responsibility as not so much an incidental property of the self as 
that by which the self is constituted.  Where the metaphysical approach 
considers numerical identity to be a precondition for responsibility, the most 
central idea I want to examine in this paper is that the exact opposite is the 
case: instead of a self-identical self being a condition for responsibility, it is 
the narrative attribution of responsibility which sets up a continuing self in 
the first place.  
8 MacIntyre refers to the “concept of a self whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative 
which links birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end.” MacIntyre, 
After Virtue, 220.
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4 Positive Account of Responsible Selfhood 
Enough of criticizing the punctualists!  What kind of positive theory of 
the self do narrativists offer that might better account for the problems of 
responsibility in the scenarios with which I started this paper?   First we need
an account of narrative theory; then we can move on to see how it accounts 
for responsibility. 
 It would be unwise to assume that all so-called “narrativists” are in 
agreement with each other. There is no one canonical narrative theory of 
selfhood: there are a cluster of theories, not always in agreement with each 
other, that all employ narrative as a means of understanding selfhood.  
Ricoeur maintains that the self has a structure which is analogous to that of 
a fictional or historical story. McIntyre seems to hold that the self actually is 
a kind of narrative.  Schechtman says that a self must be capable of 
exhibiting a narrative even if that narrative is unconscious or available only 
to others.  Dennett seems to understand a self as a fictional character within 
a narrative generated by an impersonal brain processes.9  
All these theories have two central features in common, that I will 
consider in turn.  First, a narrative mode of explanation places each action 
into the context of the history of events leading up to it and of the future 
projects towards which the self is oriented.  Secondly, and this is the feature 
I wish to focus on, to be a self is to integrate one’s life over time, making 
commitments to the future and accepting responsibility for the past. 
First, as an example, consider a narrative explanation of Mary 
attending a human rights demonstration.   The explanation might note that 
Mary has been horrified by speaking with victims of torture, she has a vision 
of a future world in which human rights would be respected, and she 
believes the demonstration which she has seen advertised will help.  The  
9 Dennett, Consciousness, 412-430
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notice advertising the demonstration could be offered as one cause of Mary’s
action, but the narrative approach goes beyond this causal account, however
correct, to explain why this notice acted as a cause of Mary’s action, even 
though other people might have been unmoved by it.  Similarly, giving a 
reason for her action -– the value she places upon human rights and a future 
torture-free world -–  while it offers a correct, teleological explanation of her 
action, fails to show why this is a value to which she is committed.  The 
narrative explanation goes beyond any simple appeal to cause, to reason or 
to a belief/desire complex by placing each of these in the historical context 
of Mary’s life.  The integration of her action into a story about how she has 
come to be the person she currently is, and what her values and future 
aspirations are, appears to be the essential requirement for the account to 
be labelled narrative.
But, secondly, this narrative history should not be understood as a 
series of impersonal, objective events but rather of actions for which the self 
is responsible.  What is it to be responsible? 
4.1 What Is Responsibility?
What is responsibility?  Let me recall that the concept involved is not 
that of legal or moral responsibility, but that basic responsibility by which I 
accept ownership of all my actions, by which I claim them to be mine and 
attribute them to myself.  Paul Ricoeur takes promising as an icon for all 
such commitments made by a self, so let me start by investigating 
promising.  I am bound by a promise only in so far as I currently interpret my
previous experience as the making of a promise.  If I come to believe that 
the words uttered yesterday were the result of hypnosis, undue pressure, the
influence of a drug, or similar circumstances, then I do not consider myself 
bound.  I am bound by a promise only insofar as I currently interpret it as a 
promise.  I could not in fact, objectively, be bound by a promise when I 
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believe myself not to be.  There is no gap here between reality and my 
knowledge of reality; it only is a promise if I know it to be a promise.  Like all 
responsibility and commitment, the condition of being bound by a promise 
can never be simply discovered; it is attributed.  But what does that mean?
The distinction between attribution and discovery can perhaps be 
elucidated by an analogy with the legal system.  Consider the question of 
whether same-sex couples can legally marry.  Some people appear to think 
that there is a fact of the matter that politicians and parliaments should 
acknowledge.  I think this makes no sense.  This is a matter for decision: it is 
up to parliaments to create laws on the subject.  Such laws might be wise or 
unwise, fair or unfair, but they cannot be false by failing to correspond with 
some pre-existing reality.  
Another analogy is with political institutions.  The Governor General 
has the power to sign acts of Parliament into law.  Nobody discovers that she
had this power all along; rather she is granted this power through an 
institutionalized appointment process.  The power is attributed to her.  
In a way analogous to the legal or political process, the condition of 
being responsible is attributed to me by a kind of interpretive process and is 
not the discovery of a pre-existing fact of the matter.  My current 
responsibility for any past commitment is a matter of me attributing an 
action to my self, that is, interpreting my status today on the basis of my 
acknowledgement of yesterday’s action as mine.  To understand myself as 
bound is for me to accept the previous commitment as mine. 
The metaphysical approach must claim that being the same self today 
and yesterday is a fact of the matter, whether anyone knows or 
acknowledges that fact or not, and it is this objective identity that underpins 
responsibility.  The narrativist position is that one being bound by a 
commitment, for example, a promise, depends on one’s interpretation, on 
whether one attributes the act of commitment to one’s self or not. 
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The metaphysical stance is realist.  The essential feature of 
metaphysical realism is that an object is what it is, and has the properties 
that it has, prior to and independently of any perception, knowledge, or 
recognition of the object.  The object is what it is “in itself” without regard to 
any subjective intervention.  From this metaphysical point of view it make 
sense to say that one is responsible even though one may be unaware of the
fact or does not acknowledge it, even privately.  This is what narrativist 
attribution is denying.
If we push this narrative analysis through to its conclusion, it is not just
responsibility which is attributed but the very status of being a self.  The 
narrativist position is that sameness of self is of the order of attribution: to 
declare myself bound by a promise today is to attribute the status “myself” 
to the originator of yesterday’s promise.  Responsibility is not so much a 
property of a prior, independently existing self as that by which the self is 
constituted.  In the case of Kenneth Parks, his mother-in-law’s death is not 
attributed to him, and so as a consequence, it was not him, the self he is 
now, that performed the action.  One’s unity over time is not a metaphysical 
self-identity, but an interpretive process in which one constitutes oneself as 
the same.  It is the metaphysical self that Schechtman is rejecting when she 
insists, “An identity in the sense of the characterization question, is not, I 
claim, something that an individual has whether she knows it or not, but 
something she has because she acknowledges her personhood and 
appropriates certain actions and experiences.”10  (Schechtman, Constitution, 
95).  
The self is not a metaphysical object with objective attributes but a 
subjective entity for which the condition of being bound is essentially linked 
to self interpretation.  If today I attribute yesterday’s experiences and 
actions to me this should not be understood as a discovery of objective 
10  Schechtman, Constitution, 95
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properties that some pre-existing self has.  Rather the process of attribution 
creates the unity of the self in the first place. 
4.2 How Could Responsible Selfhood Originate?
One way of understanding how attribution creates the self is by 
examining the conditions under which a new self might come into being.  
Computers are currently not considered to be responsible for their actions, 
that is, they are not selves. William Bechtel, however, has discussed the 
conditions under which we might in the future hold a computer responsible 
for its actions.  He argues that if a computer is programmed in such a way 
that it does what it’s told, then the responsibility for its actions rests with the
programmer not the computer.  For the computer to be responsible, it must 
be an intentional system which has beliefs based on symbols which have 
meaning for the computer system. “[Such symbols] should be thought of as 
having meaning for the computer when the way the computer system uses 
these symbols is adaptive for it in its environment and is being shaped by 
the environment through some form of selection.”11  If however the computer
learns to program itself, as he suggests a neural net does, then it is 
conceivable that we could hold it responsible for its actions.  The main factor 
here seems to be progressive learning within the history of the individual.  If 
on the basis of its past interactions with the world, a computer reconfigures 
its own program so as to approach the world differently in the future, then, 
the computer itself can be held responsible for these future actions. He says:
What we are claiming in attributing responsibility to an intentional 
system is that it was because the agent was of this kind that it made 
the decision it did.  This explains how the decisions of an intentional 
system stem from it; what remains is to account for the respect in 
11 Bechtel, “Attributing Responsibility to Computer Systems.” 302
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which the decision was under the system’s control.  The sense in which
the decision of such a system is under its control is that it responds the
way it does because of the way it adapted to its environment.  Had it 
evolved differently, then it might have decided differently.   Moreover, 
it had within it the capacity to learn and so adapt to its environment in 
different ways.12 
Bechtel’s position amounts to the claim that such an adaptive 
computer would be its own programmer, so that the responsibility for its 
current programmed responses rests with itself in so far as it designed its 
own program in the past.  In that sense it is self programmed, and so self 
responsible.  
But this position, as Bechtel himself points out, is open to an objection:
the system had no choice about what it learned, so is the question of 
ultimate responsibility not simply pushed further back?  Bechtel’s response is
that human beings are in the same boat, yet we do not deny responsibility to
them:  “We do not inquire further as to whether they [responsible humans] 
choose what they learned.” 
I think Bechtel’s response is inadequate.  It may be true that we do not
normally inquire about whether humans choose what they learned but this is
only because we assume that their learning was itself a responsible act.  If 
we believe that an individual’s “learning” took place in a brainwashing camp,
was due to membership in a cult, or was hypnotically induced, then we 
would indeed inquire further.  Normally learning is done by a self who 
accepts, rejects, or interprets the information fed to it on the basis of the 
values, information, and world view it already has.  That is, the self is more 
or less responsible for what it learns from any given situation.  In cases 
where “learning” takes place in a non-responsible manner, then we are likely
12   Bechtel, “Attributing Responsibility to Computer Systems.” 305
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to interpret the future acts of such individuals as “programmed” responses 
for which they are then, indeed, not held responsible.  
A more creative response to Bechtel’s problem is to think of the 
constitution of a self as a progressive, bootstrapping, operation.  A baby has 
no responsibility for its actions but as it grows older the kind of character 
which is has learned – not responsibly – takes on an ever increasing role in 
interpreting the information it receives from the world, so that its learning 
becomes progressively more responsible.  Hence the structure of its future 
interpretations of, and responses to, the world become more and more the 
result of its own prior responsible actions of learning.  
Indeed, the self should be understood precisely as such a structure, 
that is, as a mode of interpretation of perception and as a set of values and 
dispositions on the basis of which it responds to the world, and it is the 
previous commitments by the self which are responsible for this current 
structure.  If you ask me for $20 today, how I interpret the request, and how I
respond to it, would be determined by the promise I made to you yesterday 
to pay you that sum.  By yesterday’s promise I have, as it were, programmed
myself to respond in a particular way today.  The kind of self I am today, one 
whose actions are bound by a promise, is this kind of self because of the 
promise I gave yesterday.  “Learning,” in the sense I need here, is not simply
the accumulation of information, the addition of data which a program may 
then process, but rather a way of changing the program itself so that I 
respond to the world as a different kind of person.  A system which responds 
to its interactions with the world by changing its own modes of response in 
the future is what I am calling a responsible self, and, I agree with Bechtel, 
there is no reason in principle why a future computer system should not 
qualify.
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5 Conclusion
The self, then, to conclude, is not a metaphysical, self-identical object 
but a mode of organization of an organism, a temporal structure in which the
past, present and future are held together as a unity by the key relationship 
of responsibility.  Responsibility is not an objective relationship, but is based 
on the way in which the current self interprets previous events, attributes 
them to itself and so commits itself for the future.
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